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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HAL E. HOLMSTEAD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
VS.

ABBOTT G. M. DIESEL, INC.

Case No.

12257

Defendant and Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for damages for personal injuries
caused by the negligence of defendant's agent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court denied defndant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Thereafter, this Court granted defendant's Petition for Intermediate Appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a determination that a covenant not
to sue executed in favor of defendant's agent does not
release defendant.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff agrees with defendant's statement of facts
except for ( 1) defendant's statement of plaintiff's theory
of liability and ( 2) defendant's conspicuous omission of
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the co\·enant not to sue defendant's agent, Gideon Allen.
Defendant states that, "Plaintiff . . . seeks to hold
defendant liable under the doctrine of master and servant or respondent superior. No independant [sic] or
active negligence is alleged on the part of" defendant.
As plaintiff's argument below will more fully support,
it is his position that since defendant, a corporation,
can act only through its agents, the liability of defendant is not dependent or derivative but primary.
Defendant's silence concerning the circumstances
surrounding execution of the covenant not to sue, on the
effect of which the outcome of this appeal rests, is disingenuous at best. Since this is an intermediate appeal,
there are no facts of record relating to the execution
of the covenant beyond the mere fact of its execution.
However, in the record of Holmstead vs. Allen, Civil
No. 34120, which has been included in this record, the
court found that the covenant was entered into with
the consent and approval of defendant's counsel, that
he, as well as plaintiff's counsel, plaintiff, defendant's
agent and the latter's insurer all understood and intended that the covenant was to contain an express
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reservation of rights against plaintiff. The record in
that case further shows that the omission of such a
reservation was inadvertant and resulted from a mutual
mistake of the parties to the covenant. Defendant's
subsequent assertion of the covenant as a defense is an
attempt to take belated advantage of that mistake contrary to an understanding among counsel as to the purpose and effect of the covenant.
The facts which defendant will show at the trial
(and did show in the case of Holmstead v. Allen, are
these: During the first several months of 1969, counsel
for the plaintiff engaged in a series of negotiations in
an effort to settle plaintiff's claim short of litigation.
The insurance carrier for defendant's agent, Gideon
Allen, indicated a willingness to settle for the limits of
Allen's coverage. Negotiations with defendant's counsel
and insurance carrier were, however, unsuccessful.
On April 16, 1969, counsel for plaintiff wrote to
Fred Smith, casualty adjuster for Gideon Allen's insurance company, to confirm an earlier telephone conversation agreeing to settle for the limits of Allen's coverage. The letter stated:
"In this regard, it would be our intent to reserve
our right against Abbott G. M. Diesel and to
give a covenant not to sue or execute against
your insured."
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Plaintiff filed the present action on April 17, 1969.
Counsel for defendant requested time to file his answer
while he attempted to negotiate a settlement involvino,...,
the insurance carriers for both defendant and defendant's agent. He was unsuccessful in this effort and so
informed plaintiff.
During the period between the filing of this action
on April 17, 1969, and the filing of defendant's answer
on July 12, 1969, counsel for the parties to this action
had several conversations in the course of which Harold
G. Christensen, counsel for defendant, recommended,
in view of his failure to obtain a settlement, that plaintiff settle separately with Allen and his insurance carrier.
(See exhibits, etc., in Holmstead v. Allen.) It was
understood by both parties to these discussions with
defendant's counsel that such settlement would reserve
plaintiff's rights against defendant by means of an express
reservation in the covenant not to sue.
On July 7, 1969, plaintiff executed a covenant not
to sue in favor of Gideon Allen. As evidenced by the
letter of April 16, 1969, from plaintiff's counsel to Allen's
carrier and pursuant to the understanding reached orally
between counsel for plaintiff and defendant, such covenant was intended by the parties thereto to contain an
express reservation of plaintiff's rights against defendant. However, through a mutual mistake of fact resulting from a clerical error the reservation was omitted
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from the covenant not to sue. Mr. Mel Clement the
'
adjuster handling the final settlement for Allen's carrier,
confirmed the plaintiff's version of the facts surrounding
the execution of the covenant. (See letter of December
8, 1969, from Mel Clement, Exhibit 2 in Holmstead v.
Allen.)
When it later became apparent that counsel for
defendant, contrary to the understanding previously arrived at, intended to plead the covenant not to sue in its
own defense, plaintiff brought a separate action against
Gideon Allen and his insurer to have the covenant not
to sue reformed to include a reservation of rights against
defendant in conformity with the true intent of the
parties. The merits of the action to reform being well
known to all concerned, Gideon Allen and his insurer
made no attempt to defend and a decree of reformation
was intered on default, the effect of which was to include in the covenant a reservation of plaintiff's rights
against defendant.
In its brief on appeal, defendant argues that the
decree of reformation is not binding upon it because it
was not made a party to that action. Although plaintiff
regards this contention as wholly without merit, he has
filed a subsequent action for reformation of the covenant naming as defendants therein the present defendant
and its insurer. It is interesting that defendant resisted
vigorously, and successfully, a motion to stay this appeal
until a decision is reached in the second action for reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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formation of the covenant, which if heard would make
this point on appeal moot.
ARGUMENT
I

DEFENDANT WAS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY TO
THE ACTION TO REFORM THE COVENANT NOT TO
SUE.

The defendant contends that the decree of reformation, which amended the covenant not to sue by
reserving plaintiff's rights against defendant, is not
binding on defendant because defendant was not made
a party to the action for reformation.
The conditions upon which a person is deemed to
have a sufficient interest in the subject matter or outcome of litigation to require that he be made a party
thereto are stated in Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Porcedure, as follows:
" . . . [P]ersons having a joint interest shall be
made parties and be joined on the same side as
plaintiffs or defendants."
The rule is, of course, identical with the former
Federal Rule 19, concerning which it was held that
the purpose of the rule was to adopt the former equity
rule that all persons materially interested, either legally
or beneficially, in the subject matter of the suit, be made
parties to it. United States v. Petrosky, 2 F.R.D. 422
(W.D. Mich. 1942)
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The
question thus becomes one initially of the
nature of defendant's alleged interest in the covenant
not to sue and secondly of whether such an interest is
sufficiently material to require that defendant be made
a party to the action for reformation.
It is apparent that if defendant has any interest at

all in the covenant it is as some sort of third party beneficiary since defendant is not an immediate party thereto and gave no consideration therefor. It is hornbook
law that if such a third party beneficiary is either a
"creditor" or a "donee" beneficiary of the contract,
that is, one for whose benefit the contract was intended,
he may sue upon the contract to enforce his rights
thereunder.
"As a general proposition, the determining
factor as to the rights of a third-party beneficiary
is the intention of the parties who actually made
the contract. The real test is said to be whether
the contracting parties intended that a third person should receive a benefit which might be enforced in the courts." 17 Am. fur. 2d 727, Contracts § 304 ( 1964) .
On the other hand, the principle "is not so far extended
as to give to a third person who is only indirectly and
incidentally benefited by the contract the right to sue
upon it." Ibid., § 307.
The leading Utah case of Kelly v. Richards,
Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731 (1938), is in accord with
foregoing. There it was held that an agreement
tween stockholders of an automobile dealer and

9J
the
bean
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automobile manufacturer, whereby the stockholders were
to advance certain sums to the dealer and the manufacturer was to grant a distributorship to the dealer,
was intended for the benefit of the parties and not the
dealer and that the receiver of the dealer corporation
had no enforceable interest in the agreement even though
it would have yielded a substantial benefit to the dealer.
" . . . [A]n incidental beneficiary has no rights
under the contract. . . . [BJ efore a third party
can sue for a breach of a contract to which he
was not a party he must show that the contract
was intended to benefit him directly. . .. " 83
P.2d 736.
A more recent case refusing to enforce the interest
of an incidental third-party beneficiary is Mason v.
Tooele City, 484 P.2d 153(1971); cf. Schwinghammer
v. Alexander, 21 Utah 2d 418, 446 P.2d 414 (1968).
From these authorities it is clear that Rule 19 does
not require joinder of an incidental beneficiary in an
action between the parties to the contract to terminate
or modify their rights and obligations.
"In general, a third party does not become
indispensable to an action to terminate a contract simply because its rights or obligations under
an entirely separate contract will be seriously
affected by the termination. Thus, although the
setting aside of a lease would make impossible
the performance of a contract between the lessee
and another, it was held that the third person
was only a proper party and could be joined or
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not at the option of the plaintiff. Similarly, in a
suit by A to declare its obligations under a contract with B as terminated, C, whose obligations
to B under another contract and who will be
affected by the status of A's obligations, is not
an indispensable party." 3A Moore,s Federal
Practice 2349-50, para. 19.10 (1967). (Citing
cases; emphasis added.)
Since defendant, as an incidental beneficiary, has
no legally enforceable interest in the covenant not to
sue, it is apparent that it was not a necessary party to
the action to reform the covenant.
It should be pointed out, furthermore, that defend ant took no action in reliance on the unreformed
covenant which operated to its detriment and that no
question of estoppel arises. Defendant is no worse off
than if the covenant as originally executed had included
the reservation.
It is, therefore, the covenant as ref armed which

determines the respective rights and obligations of the
parties.
II

THE DECREE OF REFORMATION WAS VALID AND
PROPER.

Defendant attacks the validity of the decree of
reformation on the ground that parol evidence is inadmissable to vary the terms of a written instrument.
It is a universally received rule of law, however,
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that the parol evidence rule does not apply in cases of
mutual mistake. 30 Am. fur. 2d 172, Evidence § 1037
( 1967) :
"Parol evidence to show such mutual mistake ... may be introduced in an action in equity
to reform the written contract because of the
mutual mistake."
Thus, the fact that a release was entered into
through mutual mistake may be shown by parol evidence. Lion Oil Ref. Co. v. Albritton, 21 F.2d 280 (8th
Cir. 1927).
III
A COVENANT NOT TO SUE AN AGENT WITH EXPRESS RESERVATION OF RIGHTS AGAINST THE CORPORATE PRINCIPAL DOES NOT RELEASE THE CORPORATE PRINCIPAL.

Although it is widely held that a release of one
joint tortfeasor releases all, 45 Am. fur. 699, Release § 35
( 1943), it is well settled that a mere covenant not to
sue has no such effect on those jointly liable, Ibid., § 4:
"By the great weight of authority, a covenant not to sue ... one joint tort-feasor is held not
to amount to a release, and therefore such an
agreement is held not to discharge the other joint
... tort-feasors." pp. 676-77.
Particularly is this so where there is an express reservation of rights against the other joint tort-feasor.
By statute in Utah (the Uniform Joint Obligations
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Act) it is provided that the release of one joint obligator
"shall not discharge co-obligors against whom the obligee
in writing and as part of the some transaction as the
release or discharge expressly reserves his rights . . . "
§ 15-4-4 U.C.A. ( Repl. vol. 1962). Although no Utah
case has considered whether section 4 of the Uniform
Obligations Act applies to covenants not to sue as well
as releases, the Wisconsin courts have so decided on
identical language. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Continental Gas. Co., 264 Wis. 493, 59 N.W. 2d 425
( 1953). The Utah statute was held to apply to a covenant not to sue in United States v. First Security Bank
of Utah, 208 F.2d 424, 42 A.L.R. 2d 951 (10th Cir.
1953).
In light of the foregoing authorities it would seem
obvious enough that the covenant not to sue executed
in favor of defendant's agent, Gideon Allen, but expressly
reserving plaintiff's rights aginst defendant is effective
according to its terms. Defendant contends, however,
that the above stated rules apply only in the case of
joint tort-feasors, that its liability is merely secondary,
arising solely by reason of the doctrine of respondeat
superior, and that a covenant not to sue one primarily
liable does release one who is secondarily liable, notwithstanding the reservation of rights against the one

secondarily liable.
Defendant's position, however, ( 1) misconceives the
nature of a corporation's liability for the acts of its agSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ents, ( 2) is inconsistent with the better reasoned authorities and ( 3) disregards principles of sound statutory
construction.
The Constitution of the State of Utah provides that
"all corporations ... shall be subject to be sued, in all
courts, in like cases as natural persons." Art. XII, § 4
(Emphasis added.) A corporation is, however, an artificial person and can act only through its agents. If
corporations are to be subject to suit "in all courts, in
like cases as natural persons" it follows inexorably, from
the language of the Constitution, that corporations must
be held primarily liable for the acts of their agents. Hypertechnical distinctions between the "primary" liability
of an agent and the "secondary" liability of his principal
supposed to result from the doctrine of respondeat super·
ior are wholly inappropriate in the context of a corporate
principal and its employee. If a corporation is only
"secondarily" liable for the acts of its agents one may
well ask, when is a corporation "primarily" liable? Indeed, how then are corporations "subject to be sued
... as natural persons"? The distinction is clearly intolerable both in logic and justice.
For that reason, no doubt, the better reasoned cases
give effect to the intention of him who, in executing a
covenant not to sue an employee, expressly reserves his
rights against the corporate principle. A leading case
is Ellis v. Jewett Rhoades Motor Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d
395, 84 P.2d 791 ( 1938), in which the corporate de-
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fcndant defended on the ground that a covenant not to
sue its employee, whose negligence had caused plaintiff's
in juries, released the corporate principle. The court expressly rejected the theory that the covenant not to sue
the servant exonerated his master.
Similarly, applying the Uniform Joint Obligations
Act, a New York court in Wilson v. New York, 131 N.Y.
Supp, 2d 47, held that a municipal corporation was
liable for an assault by its police officer where the
plaintiff had released the latter under an instrument
expressly reserving rights against the municipality.
Even in cases where the principal is a natural person some courts have been reluctant to make artificial
distinctions between "primary" liability of the agent and
"secondary" liability of the principal. Thus in Boucher
v. Thomsen, 328 Mich. 312, 43 N.W. 2d 866, 20 A.LR.
2d 1038 ( 1950), the court held that the owner of an
automobile might be liable for the negligence of a garage
employee who was testing out the automobile although
the plaintiff had agreed not to pursue his rights against
the garage and its employee. The court recognized that
the car owner might be entitled to reimbursement from
the garage owner and his employee, but found that the
express language of the covenant left no question as to
the intention of the parties, and that their intention was
controlling.
And in Hunt v. Ziegler, 271 S.W. 936, (Tex. Civ.
App.), aff'd. 280 S.W. 546 (Tex. Com. App. 1925) the
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court refused to recognize an attempted distinction between joint tort-feasors and master and servant, finding
the distinction superficial.
Although the Utah courts have never passed upon
the precise issue raised by defendant, the question was
answered on Utah law by the Tenth Circuit in United
States v. First Security Bank of Utah, 208 F.2d 424, 42
A.LR. 2d 951 ( 10th Cir. 1953). This was an action
under the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover for injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of the driver
of a United States mail car. The plaintiffs executed
covenants not to sue in favor of the mail carrier, expressly reserving their rights against the government.
Holding that plaintiffs' action against the government
was not barred by the covenant, the court reasoned as
follows:
"It is generally recognized . . . that a covenant
not to sue one or more tort-feasors with express
reservation of the right to proceed against others
does not bar an action against other joint tortfeasors . . . While [a master and servant J may
not be joint tort-feasors in the sense that their
joint acts caused an injury, a majority of courts
hold that their liability is joint and several and
each is liable to the full extent of the injuries
and they may be joined in an action in the same
manner as joint tort-feasors. The law of joint
tort-feasors relating to releases and covenants not
to sue is applicable." 42 A.LR. 2d 958. (Emphasis added.)
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These authorities accord with a fundamental policy
of subordinating technical legal doctrine to the clearly
expressed and understood intentions of the parties, a
policy embodied in the Uniform Joint Obligations Act.
Defendant's sophistries, to the effect that it might be
able to recover over from its employee if under Utah
law it is regarded as a surety, disregard sound principles
of statutory construction.
By statute in Utah legislation in derogation of the
common law is to be liberally construed. Section 68-3-2
U.C.A. (Repl. vol. 1968). One must consider, therefore,
the policy of the statute. Considerable light is shed on
that policy by the following comment at 73 A.LR. 2d
407-408 ( 1960), criticizing the rule that the release of
one joint tort-feasor releases all:
"The rule has been vigorously attacked by law
writers. It has been described as merely a 'surviving relic of the Cokian period of metaphysics.'
It tends to def eat the fair expectations and intentions of the parties to the release. It may be
noted that all but one of the Continental legal
systems have flatly rejected the rule. . ..
"The harshness of the original common-law
rule has resulted in legislation abrogating the
rule . . . . . such as the Uniform Joint Obligations
Act. . . .
"In the absence of statutory regulation, the
modern trend is toward a rule which abrogates
the strict comon-law release rule and makes the
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intention of the parties to a releast the test of
its effect as a release of joint tort-feasors not
. th eret o. . . .,,
part ies
The Uniform Joint Obligations Act has been adopted in Nevada, New York, Utah and Wisconsin. Only
New York has considered the effect of Section 4 on a
covenant not to sue an agent reserving rights against
his principal, holding that the principal is not released
thereby. Wilson v. New York, 131 N.Y. Supp. 2d 47;
Wilson v. Econom, 288 N.Y. Supp. 2d 381, 56 Misc.
2d 272.
One could hardly imagine a case better calculated
to illustrate the very evils against which the statute and
the modem trend of decisions is directed than the present
one. If ever there was a resort to "Cokian metaphysics"
to "defeat the fair expectations and intentions of the
parties" it is defendant's brief on appeal.
The decision of the Court in this case will forge
new law in the state of Utah. Plaintiff urges that the
Court follow the modem trend of decisions, as exemplified by United States v. First Security Bank of Utah,
208 F.2d 424, 42 A.L.R. 2d 951 (10th Cir. 1953), and
give heed to the policy of the Uniform Joint Obligations
Act. Defendant suffers nothing but, perhaps, the loss
of an unearned advantage from the rule that a covenant
not to sue an agent may reserve rights against a prin·
cipal. A contrary holding would have the harshest of
results for plaintiff.
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IV
EVEN WITHOUT AN EXPRESS RJESERVATION OF
RIGHTS

AGAINST

THE

CORPORATE

PRINCIPAL

A

COVENANT NOT TO SUE AN AGENT DOES NOT RELEASE THE CORPORATE PRINCIPAL.

If the Court should decide that the decree of reformation is not binding on defendant, it is plaintiff's
position that even without the reservation of plantiff's

rights against defendant the covenant not to sue does
not release defendant.
As argued above, Point III:
"By the great weight of authority, a covenant not to sue ... one joint tort-feasor is held not
to amount to a release, and therefore such an
agreement is held not to discharge the other joint
. . . tort-feasors." 45 Am. fur. 676-77, Release
§ 4 ( 1943).
To hold otherwise in this case the Court would have to
employ the discredited distinction between "primary"
and "secondary" liability of a corporation and its agents,
respectively. For the reasons set forth in his argument
under Point IIL above, plaintiff urges the Court not to
do so.
Valuable authority is found in the recent Nevada
case, Whittlesea v. Farmer, 469 P.2d 57, (Nev. 1970),
in which the court, observing the similarity between a
covenant not to sue and a covenant not to execute, held
ti .at a covenant not to execute in favor of one joint tortfeasor did not relea'5e a second joint tort-feasor even
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though plaintiff's rights against the latter were not expressly reserved.
CONCLUSION
The covenant not to sue executed by plaintiff in
favor of defendant's employee was validly reformed to
include an inadvertantly and mistakenly omitted reservation of plaintiff's rights against defendant. By the
better view, that reservation is effective according to the
intent of the parties. Furthermore, defendant was aware
of that intention and led plaintiff to believe that it would
defend on the merits of the case. Even if it should be
held that the reservation is invalid as against defendant,
the modem view is that a covenant not to sue operates
only in favor of the parties thereto and cannot be asserted by one who is jointly liable notwithstanding the
absence of an express reservation of rights against him.
Plaintiff requests that this case be returned to the
district court for trial on the merits.

-/ - -~J~b~_
_/,
ckson Howard, for:

HOWARD AND LEWIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
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